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Abstract: 
 
The extent of poverty reduction has varied enormously during the recovery period 
across the eighty-three regions of Russia, with some regions continuing to experience 
increases in poverty even though they have returned to growth. We attempt to 
understand and analyse the reasons for this regional variation. We focus on two 
principal causative factors: the changes in economic structure resulting from the 
liberalisation of the economy, and policy instruments aimed at poverty reduction. We 
find that many regions which experienced structural change under perestroika (notably 
those benefiting from the current oil and gas boom) experienced massive growth in 
GDP but little poverty reduction, because their prevailing production function is capital-
intensive and thus they were unable to transmit much or any reduction in poverty 
through the labour market. Regions where the growth of the early 2000s was 
diversified, was based more on the service sector, and where the educational system 
made possible flexibility within the labour market, tended to be more effective at 
generating poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
Key words: Russia, poverty, regional analysis 
 
JEL: I32, P26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments: 
 
 We are grateful to G. Reza Arabsheibani, Alla Chirikova, Andy Dickerson, Vladimir 
Gimpelson, Liliya Ovcharova, Ludmila Khakhulina, Nicholas Mosley, Simona Mateut, 
and Natalya Zubarevich for useful conversations and discussions. This research was 
supported by the Economic and Social Research Council’s grant RES 000-156-0016 
(“The political economy of pro-poor adjustment”).  
 
  
 
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In few countries have the social costs of adjustment been as severe as in 
Russia. The widespread market reforms initiated by the Russian Federation in 
1992 following the disintegration of the Soviet Union had severe macro-
economic consequences, including a hyperinflation in 1992-3, an output decline 
of more than 40% between 1992 and 1998, a chronic fiscal gap which became 
acute when Russia succumbed to the ‘East Asian crisis’ in 1998, and a massive 
downsizing of the public sector across the entire field of economic activity. Once 
the government withdrew from ownership and control of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), those enterprises shed several million jobs, with the axe 
falling particularly heavily on the less competitive and more vulnerable groups of 
workers, especially females1, the less skilled, and those living in regions which 
lacked competitive or political leverage. Labour market distortions led to rising 
wage arrears that, at their peak in 1997, affected around two-thirds of the 
workforce (Lehman, Wadsworth and Acquisti, 1999); and because of the fiscal 
crisis, social welfare payments, so far from being increased to help these 
vulnerable groups, were radically reduced. In the process, the Gini index of 
inequality rose from one of the lowest in the world at the end of the 1980s to a 
level higher than that of the United States (Brainerd 1998), and poverty, on 
several indicators, grew to frightening levels. In Russia between 1992 and 1998, 
the headcount index of poverty grew, although measures of this vary, by a 
factor of about three (Klugman and Braithwaite 1998; see further Table 1 
below); there was a general deterioration in health and morbidity (Stillman 2005; 
Stillman and Thomas 2008); overall mortality, which in other countries afflicted 
by adjustment continued on a declining trend, rose continuously through the 
decade2; and even suicide rates experienced a sharp upward trend (Brainerd, 
2001). Thus the process of macro-economic adjustment, which imposed severe 
social costs around the world, in Russia took on the nature of a catastrophe. 
  
Between 1999 and 2000 there was a turning-point: the persistent decline 
in the Russian macro-economy ended, and annual GDP growth in the 
subsequent period under the presidency of Vladimir Putin, during which state 
policy has been once again a great deal more interventionist, has averaged 
over 5 per cent since those years (Hanson, 2007a). The World Bank, in its 
recent review, describes this economic recovery (to 2002) as being ‘pro-poor’ 
(2004: xii, para.9). However, apart from this initial assessment, relatively little is 
known about the ability of that growth to relieve the disturbing levels of poverty 
which appeared during the period of perestroika: about whether that growth is 
‘pro-poor’ in the sense investigated by the recent World Bank review of country 
experience (Besley and Cord, 2007) and about whether any politically feasible 
policies exist which might make it more so. 
  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate those questions.  In Section 2, 
we review the overall evolution of poverty and other well-being indicators since 
the millennium, and show that although poverty has shrunk across Russia as a 
whole since 2000, there is considerable cross-regional and cross-sectoral 
                                                        
1
 During the transition, female employment dropped even more markedly than female labour 
force participation and by 2000 a substantial gender gap in pay had emerged (Kazakova, 2007). 
2
 The crude death rate rose from 12 to 15 per thousand between 1990 and 2001 (Stillman 2006, 
p. 114). The overall relationship between depth of reform and mortality across all the transition 
economies is investigated by Brainerd (1998).  
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variation, and in some regions of Russia such growth as there is provides few or 
even negative benefits to the poor. Section 3 examines macro-economic 
conditions. Section 4 tries to understand variations in ‘poverty elasticity’, that is 
in the tendency of the post-2000 growth process to be pro-poor or otherwise in 
particular regions, and shows that this is determined partly by the changes in 
economic structure induced by perestroika but partly by political factors. In 
Section 5, we sketch out a model and we test a simple model of the interaction 
between these factors in Section 6, using case-studies of the most and least 
pro-poor regions to give light and shade to the model. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Evolution of Poverty and Income Inequality 
 
As already mentioned, the trend of indicators of poverty and deprivation in 
Russia during the 1990s and 2000s varies not only according to the indicator of 
poverty selected, but also according to the source; Table 1 sets out some of the 
alternative measures which exist.  
  
Table 1. Indicators of Living Standards, 1990-2006 
Year Headcount 
index (P0)  
Gini coefficient 
of inequality 
  
Real  
wage 
Mortality 
 
Life  
expectancy 
 
 
Official 
poverty 
line 
 
‘Extreme 
poverty’ 
($2/ 
day) 
FSSS World 
Bank 
 
FSSS 
1990 0.101     11.2 69.38 
1991 0.114     11.4 69.01 
1992 0.335    67 12.2 67.89 
1993 0.315    100 14.5 65.14 
1994 0.224 22.7  0.483 92 15.7 63.98 
1995 0.248  0.387  72 15.0 64.64 
1996 0.220 22.6  0.461 106 14.2 65.89 
1997 0.207    105 13.8 66.64 
1998 0.233 36.26  0.486 87 13.6 67.02 
1999 0.283    78 14.7 65.93 
2000 0.290 23.76 0.395 0.456 121 15.3 65.34 
2001 0.275  0.397  120 15.6 65.23 
2002 0.246 13.48 0.397 0.399 116.2 16.2 64.95 
2003 0.203  0.403  111 16.4 64.85 
2004 0.176  0.409  110.6 16.0 65.27 
2005 0.177  0.406  112.6 16.1 65.30 
2006 0.153  0.410  113.3 15.2 66.60 
Notes and sources: Headcount index of poverty (col. 1) = proportion of individuals with incomes 
below the national poverty line; for 1992-1999, official poverty line estimates are from 2004 
Russia in Figures; for 2000-2006 estimates are from 2007 Russia in Figures. [Note that after 
2000 the poverty estimates move on to a different methodology; in 2005, change to consumer 
basket structure occurred. International poverty line (col. 2) = poverty headcount ratio at $2 a 
day (PPP) (% of population); estimates are from World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(WDI), 2005 edition. Gini Index (col. 3) = income inequality measure, expressed to two 
significant figures. Alternative estimates from FSSS and from World Bank, WDI 2005 edition, 
are displayed. Real wage (col. 4) = inflation-adjusted wage relative to the previous year; from 
FSSS. Mortality and Life Expectancy measures (cols. 7 and 8) are from Regions of Russia 
(various years). Adjusted, following 2002 Population Census, data are reported.  
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As shown in Table 1, there was a sharp increase in all indicators of 
poverty, including mortality, at the beginning of the 1990s; after the early 1990s 
all the headcount indicators of poverty experience a temporary dip, rise again 
during the macro-economic crisis of 1998-99, and do not begin to fall definitively 
until that crisis is over. During the 1998-99 crisis, a particularly heavy burden of 
adjustment falls on to pensioners: in 1998 alone, the nominal pension as a 
proportion of the poverty line falls by 40%3). The deterioration in the mortality 
indicators persists for an even longer period. The death rate rises continuously 
through the 1990s and early 2000s, from 11 to 16 per thousand, and does not 
begin to fall until 2004. Life expectancy, for the federation as a whole, falls from 
69.4 in 1990 to 64.8 in 2003; life expectancy rises to 65.2 with a continued slight 
increase in 20054. It seems likely, therefore, that the turning point in all the 
morbidity and mortality indicators was well into in the early 2000s, some three to 
four years after the turning-point in the headcount poverty indicators5. 
 
Only the unadjusted headcount index of poverty (P0) is presented in 
Table 1. In Table 2, we present expenditure-based estimates of poverty indices 
based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), a nationally 
representative survey that contained around 6,000 households in the first four 
rounds. The data show that headcount poverty rate rose to 37 per cent in 1993 
and further to 41 per cent in 1995. However, the poverty depth indicator FGT(1) 
- the average amount by which someone who was poor fell below the poverty 
line - peaked in 1993 – and the poverty severity index FGT(2), that takes into 
account inequality among the poor (as larger poverty gaps acquire greater 
weight and the measure becomes sensitive to these gaps),  peaked in 1993. 
The FGT(2), which is the most sensitive to depth of poverty, begins to improve 
in 1994: the implication may be that the most severe deprivation was 
experienced during the period of greatest macro-economic dislocation between 
1991 and 1993.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                        
3
 The absolute value in headcount poverty around the turn of the millennium is difficult to gauge 
because there is a change in the method of computation by FSSS in 2000. Nonetheless it 
seems clear that there was a turning-point in the trend of headcount poverty at exactly this time, 
as this is indicated also by the World Bank $2/day measure. 
4
 There is a substantial literature about the main causes of this persisting increase in mortality. It 
seems clear that mortality from cardiovascular diseases rose by much more than mortality as a 
whole, and was a major contributor to the increase in the overall death rate (Stillman, 2005). 
5
 One likely reason for this later turning point is illustrated by Stillman and Thomas (2008, Table 
1, p. 1393): during the crisis, consumption of fats and starches went up but consumption of 
fresh fruits and vegetables fell sharply, worsening the diet especially of low-income people and 
increasing mortality rates.  
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Table 2. Indicators of Poverty, 1992-1995 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Poor households  25.2 31.9 26.8 35.0 
Very poor households 8.4 12.0 10.4 10.9 
FGT(0) 26.8 36.9 30.9 41.1 
FGT(1) 9.8 13.6 11.7 13.2 
FGT(2) 5.4 8.0 7.2 6.0 
Notes: Poor households = share of households with expenditure below the official poverty line; 
Very poor households = share of households with expenditures less than half the poverty line. 
FGT(0), FGT(1) and FGT(2) are the standard Foster-Greer-Thorbecke aggregate poverty 
measures.  See Ravallion (1992) for further details.   
Source: Klugman and Braithwaite (1998, Table 3). 
 
 
A few data-related caveats are required. Both World Bank and FSSS 
poverty estimates are computed by applying the prices from household surveys 
to cost the minimum consumption basket. However, the nature of the survey 
data used has changed through time, both in terms of coverage and in terms of 
weights between commodities. The method of calculating the poverty line 
originally adopted under Khrushchev in the late 1950s was revised in November 
1992. According to Ovcharova (2001), the new poverty line was revised 
downwards, representing 70 per cent of the Soviet level; it increased the weight 
placed on food expenditures, and excluded some durables (furniture and 
kitchen appliances). The non-food basket consisted of non-food products (19.1 
per cent), services (7.4 per cent) and compulsory payments and charges (5.2 
per cent). In 1994, in view of growing wage arrears and growing earnings in 
informal economy, an expenditure-based poverty measure was introduced to 
reduce the measurement bias associated with the income-based approach. In 
2000 there is a further break in the poverty line: a new methodology was 
introduced that places more weight on non-food expenditures and services, 
differentiates estimates of the subsistence minimum by region, and broadens 
the sampling base (since 2000) to cover around 49,000 households: the new 
(post-2000) poverty line is estimated to be 15 to 20 per cent higher, in real 
terms, than that of 1992-99 (World Bank, 2004). For these reasons, we must 
note that across-time comparisons of several of the poverty indices discussed 
are imperfect, and much of the work of this paper consists of an attempt to 
improve comparability by correcting these imperfections.  
 
 It is useful to compare the official estimates of both poverty and 
inequality with World Bank (2004) estimates that use a different poverty line and 
methodology. In particular, the World Bank methodology estimates the value of 
food and non-food baskets on the basis of household consumption patterns, 
attempts to adjust between regions for inconsistencies in the official subsistence 
minimum, and makes adjustments to take account of economies of scale in 
non-food goods and services. The comparative poverty indices are plotted in 
Figure 1, and suggest that the World Bank (2004) estimates at any rate are 
more sensitive to economic shocks (Figure 1): the poverty peak around the 
1998 financial crisis was more severe on the World Bank than on the FSSS 
computation method6. According to that approach, around 23.9 million 
                                                        
6
 Note that this applies strictly to the 1998-99 crisis only. As we do not have international 
poverty-line estimates for 1991 through 1994, the peak years of macro- economic 
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Russians, or about 16.4 per cent of the population, survived on less than $2 per 
day (expressed in 2000 purchasing power parity terms), the international 
poverty line for middle-income countries.7  
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2004, Table 6.3). 
 
 
 
  The Gini index of inequality, as measured by both the FSSS and the 
World Bank, climbs sharply though the early 1990s; however, after the middle of 
the decade there is a divergence between the two series. The World Bank 
inequality series continues to climb through the later part of the 1990s and then 
settles back, like its headcount poverty series, in 2000; by contrast, the FSSS 
series has a dip in the mid-nineties, climbs again around the time of the 1998 
financial crisis, and then settles back. Some elements of inequality, however, 
have continued to increase through the early 2000s up to the present, notably 
inequality of earnings between men and women.  
 
 In terms of income and inequality, therefore, the element of consensus 
emerging from the different sources is that there was a turning-point in both 
poverty and interpersonal inequality at the end of the 1990s, with a later turning-
point for mortality and morbidity than for the poverty headcount. Income 
inequality, after its huge increase in the early 1990s, has reached a plateau.  
 
 However what is enormously heterogeneous, and not previously 
                                                                                                                                                                  
disequilibrium, it is not easy to make inter-series comparisons for the earlier part of the crisis – 
but the World Bank $2/day estimate for 1995 is only just over half the FSSS estimate, 
suggesting that at that time the World Bank series may have been less volatile. 
7
 At that point, 4 million people (2.7 per cent of the population) lived in absolute deprivation even 
measured by the standards of the poorest populations of the world, e.g. in Africa ($1.07-a-day 
measure, or $1 at 2000 PPP) and, over half the population (around 75.6 million) lived below the 
$4 PPP poverty line used for international comparisons in developed economies. 
Figure 1. Poverty Rates (%), 1997-2002 
0 
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documented, is the diversity in regional trends in poverty. Post-transitional 
Russia, with population of around 142.1 million (in 2006) spread across 11 time 
zones, 6,592,800 square miles and 83 units of devolved government, or ‘federal 
subjects’ now, in the wake of the widening of income distribution previously 
referred to, contains regions with a per capita income as high as Luxemburg, as 
well as regions with an average with as low as sub-Saharan Africa 8. Moreover, 
growth now that it has resumed has not been evenly spread, and in some 
regions of Russia, as has been the case internationally, quite strong growth 
even where achieved has been associated not with a decrease but with an 
increase in poverty, in defiance of the federal trend towards declining levels of 
poverty; in some regions mortality is still increasing.  
 
In Table 3, using the repeated cross-sections that combine July and 
September waves of the 2000-2006 Monitoring of Economic and Social 
Changes public opinion survey conducted by the Russian Centre for Public 
Opinion Research (or VCIOM, its Russian acronym)9, we present inequality and 
poverty measures assessed with reference to total disposable income which 
includes cash wages and salaries, income from self-employment, imputed 
incomes from home production and in-kind income, dividends, income from 
rentals, social transfers and inter-household cash transfers.  The poverty line is 
set to equal 50% of median income. The income figures are adjusted for 
inflation (July 2000 = 100) using price deflators provided by FSSS. We use 
modified OECD equivalence scale to adjust for household composition, 
assuming equal distribution of income among household members.10 We 
compare poverty to benchmarks 19.3 per cent in 1992 and 20.1 per cent in 
1995 reported by Förster, Jesuit and Smeeding (2003) and 18.8 per cent in 
1999-2002 report in UNDP (2006).  
 
  Extending the discussion forward to 2006, the comparison with 
benchmark estimates shows that economic recovery has brought some 
improvements at the national level. At 14.3 per cent in 2006, the headcount rate 
has declined by around 29 per cent when compared to the 1995 rate.  However, 
between 2000 and 2006, we do not find any significant reductions in the Foster-
Greer-Thorbecke poverty indices. When analysing the whole distribution and 
censored distribution of individuals below the poverty line, we find some 
improvements in 2006. In particular, while the mean of income for all individuals 
rose to 1,550 roubles - the mean of income for individuals living below the 
poverty line increased from 370 roubles to 466 roubles; the ratio of the (mean) 
poverty gap to the mean income for poor individuals decreased from 50.5 per 
cent to 35.6 per cent.11  
 
                                                        
8
 IISP (2007a).  
9
 See Data Appendix for further details.  
10
 The OECD revised equivalence scale (ES) with stronger scale economies is given by: ES = 
0.5 + 0.5 × adults + 0.3 × children. 
11
 Due to possible data contamination, we also estimated poverty measures using trimmed data. 
In the absence of any specific information about contamination distribution, we used ‘balanced 
trimming’ by removing 1 per cent from each tail of the distribution. As a result, the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke poverty indices decreased in magnitude but showed no significant reductions 
between 2000 and 2006. See Cowell, Litchfield, and Mercader-Prats (1999) for further 
discussions on sources and methods for treatment of data contamination.   
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Table 3. Poverty Indices, 2000-2006   
 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Panel A. Actual Income  
FGT(0) 0.166 0.153 0.164 0.143 
FGT(1) 0.056 0.043 0.054 0.037 
FGT(2) 0.028 0.018 0.027 0.015 
Mean of income (roubles) 1,425 1,852 1,430 1,550 
Mean of income amongst poor (roubles) 370 549 397 466 
Mean of poverty gaps (roubles) 187 214 197 166 
N (weighted) 4,436 3,830 3,964 3,866 
Panel B.  Adjusted for Non-respondents  (Heckman  two-step) 
FGT(0) 0.169 0.159 0.178 0.152 
FGT(1) 0.058 0.044 0.057 0.040 
FGT(2) 0.029 0.019 0.028 0.016 
Mean of income (roubles) 1,463 2,002 1,461 1,572 
Mean of income amongst poor (roubles) 384 576 423 488 
Mean of poverty gaps (roubles) 201 224 199 174 
N (weighted) 4,814 4,210 4,215 4,213 
Panel C. Adjusted for Non-respondents (Propensity Score Matching)    
FGT(0) 0.173 0.161 0.173 0.141 
FGT(1) 0.059 0.046 0.055 0.037 
FGT(2) 0.030 0.020 0.027 0.015 
Mean  income (roubles) 1,483 1,940 1,463 1,572 
Mean  income amongst poor (roubles) 378 562 411 466 
Mean poverty gaps (roubles) 198 230 195 169 
N (weighted) 4,814 4,210 4,215 4,064 
Notes: (i) Estimates are based on inflation adjusted per capita household income (July 
2000=100). Official inflation indices were used (ii) In Panel B estimates, identification comes 
from functional form. The RHS variables included ‘Age’, ‘Age squared’, education dummies 
(‘University’, ‘Technical’, Vocational’ and Secondary’), population point dummies (‘Moscow, St. 
Petersburg’, ‘Rural’), gender dummy (‘Female’), number of workers in the household, and 
dummy variables that identify sources of income. Full details and estimates are available on 
request. (iv) Estimates in Panel C are based on counterfactual income (for non-respondents) 
using propensity score matching. The RHS variables are same as in the Heckit model. Full 
details and estimates are available on request    
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the VCIOM data.  
  
  We now introduce corrections for non-response. Around 9 per cent of 
respondents fail to report family income. Thus, if non-reporting is not random, 
the estimates shown in Panel A of Table 3 are biased. To account for the 
possible sample selection bias, we apply a two-stage Heckman model and 
predict family income for non-respondents (a procedure which suffers from the 
problem that the correction term (λ ), was insignificant in the 2004 and 2006 
samples). The results based on predicted family income, presented in Panel B, 
are very similar to those based on reported income. The corrected means of 
incomes are slightly higher than the uncorrected means, suggesting that non-
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reporting is skewed toward high-income households. In Panel C, we present our 
estimates based on the matching estimator technique where treatment is the 
non-reporting of income. We use the same set of variables as in the Heckit 
procedure. We use the most straightforward matching estimator, the Nearest 
Neighbour matching with replacement.12 We find that the adjusted poverty rate 
of around 9 per cent is 6 per cent lower that the results based on the unadjusted 
poverty lines used in Panels A and B and 10 per cent lower than the poverty 
rate reported in World Bank (2002).   
 
 We now turn to the analysis of income inequality. In Table 4, we present 
our estimates of income inequality measures. This suggests some tentative 
evidence, at the aggregate level, of reduction in income inequality from the 
extremely high levels of the late nineties. Examination of selected percentiles of 
the household income distribution show that the P90/P10 percentile ratio that 
refers to points near the extremes of the distribution fell from 6.00 in 2000 to 
5.12 in 2006. The P10/P50 ratio shows that the income at the lowest decile 
relative to the median was stable, increasing sharply in 2006. We also find that 
per capita income at the 90th percentile relative to the median declined in 2002 
and remained stable between 2004 and 2006. Despite Russia’s economic 
recovery, we discover that an alternative measure of inequality - the Gini 
coefficient - fell by little more than 4 per cent. We conclude that most of the 
increase (9) in income inequality took place in the early stages of economic 
transition (2000 and 2002).  
  
Table 4. Inequality Indices, 2000-2006   
 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Panel A. Actual Income     
Gini 0.422 0.378 0.391 0.376 
P90/P10 ratio 6.000 5.280 5.928 5.128 
P90/P50 ratio 2.640 2.333   2.500 2.552 
P10/P50 ratio 0.440 0.442 0.422 0.498   
Panel B. Adjusted for Non-respondents  (Heckman  two-step) 
Gini 0.419 0.400 - - 
P90/P10 ratio 5.952 5.445 - - 
P90/P50 ratio 2.586 2.400 - - 
P10/P50 ratio 0.434 0.441 - - 
Panel C. Adjusted for Non-respondents  (Propensity Score Matching) 
Gini 0.434 0.395 0.396 0.379 
P90/P10 ratio 6.173 5.520 6.160 5.324 
P90/P50 ratio 2.604 2.475 2.640 2.594 
P10/P50 ratio 0.422 0.448 0.429 0.487 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the VCIOM data.  
Post-transitional Russia, with population of around 142 million spread 
across 11 time zones, 6,592,800 square miles and 83 federal subjects with 
considerable disparities in the initial economic conditions, experienced different 
                                                        
12
 See Kaliendo and Kopeinig (2005) for details.  
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patterns of poverty and income inequality levels. Regional differences are 
striking. In Dagestan and Tuva republics, poverty rates far exceeded those at 
the national level. In 1997, close to 80 per cent of the population in the two 
regions was living in poverty13. Muscovites, as well as St. Petersburg and 
Tyumen residents, fared better (World Bank, 2004). Regional differences in 
poverty and income inequality are striking and important to assess as 
increasing concentration of poverty leads to regional polarization.14  
 
 In Table 5, we present results of inequality decomposition based on the 
mean log deviation.15 Estimates show that inequality within regions account for 
the majority of the mean log deviation. Inequality between regions accounts for 
increasingly larger share, rising from 18.4 per cent in 2000 to 23 per cent in 
2004. Our empirical findings are consistent with the work by Yemtsov (2006), 
confirming that inequality between regions is growing.16  
 
Table 5. Regional Decomposition of the Mean Log Income, 2000-2006     
 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Mean log deviation   
(total)  
0.316 
(100%) 
0.245 
(100%) 
0.270 
(100%) 
0.238 
(100%) 
Within regions   
(as share of total) 
0.258 
(81.6%) 
0.198 
(80.8%) 
0.206 
(77.1%) 
0.192 
(80.7%) 
Between regions  
(as share of total)  
0.058 
(18.4%) 
0.047 
(19.2%) 
0.062 
(22.9%) 
0.046 
(19.3%) 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the VCIOM data.  
 
 Subjective welfare indicators are useful in ascertaining welfare impacts 
as perceived by survey respondents and enhance our understanding of 
interactions between self-rated economic welfare and sustainability of 
adjustment.17 In Table 6, tabulations show the percent distribution of the 
subjective status change variable. Assuming that the answers are inter-
                                                        
13
 See World Bank (2004, Table A.3.2).  
14
 See, for example, Yemtsov (2003) for the earlier estimates of regional variations in income 
inequality.  
15
 Based on Theil (1967, 1979) mean log deviation index, expressed as: ∑=
=
n
i iy
y
n
T
1
0 log
1
where 
iy  is the income of individual i , and y  the arithmetic mean  income, Theil inequality 
decomposition method is given by: ∑ ∑+=
= =
J
j
J
g j
j
jjj
v
w
wTwT
1 1
00 log where jw  and jv  is the 
population share and income share (respectively) of the thj   region, jT0  is the mean log 
deviation measure calculated for all individuals in region j  that consists of jn  individuals. The 
first term gives a weighted average of  jT0  and hence represents the component of overall 
intraregional inequality. The second term is the mean log deviation measure calculated on 
mean income of each region and gives the component of inequality that is due to interregional 
inequality.   
16
 Yemtsov (2003), using the 1994-2000 HBS data, reports that differences between regions help 
to account for 85 per cent of the increase in total inequality and the gap between affluent 
(Moscow, St. Petersburg) and resource-rich (Tyumen) regions and the rest of Russia has 
widened. 
17
 See Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) for theoretical arguments and applications using the RLMS 
data.   
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personally comparable, in general, we find that an increasing share of 
individuals report improved welfare status in the past 12 months. The proportion 
of individuals for whom welfare worsened dramatically declined for both 
genders:  from 41.4 (43.9) per cent in 2000 to 23.4 (27.1) per cent in 2006 in the 
case of males (females). We find similar trends for those living in the oblasts 
and republics. For Moscow and St. Petersburg, there was a larger reduction 
(increase) in the share of individuals for whom welfare worsened (improved). 
For instance, worsening (improving) welfare standards were less (more) 
probable for Moscow and St. Petersburg residents when using the 2006 data. In 
sum, males and Muscovites assess their well-being more favourably.   
  
Table 6. Perceived Changes in Welfare, 2000-2006.     
 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Panel A. Males 
    
Improved 9.2 14.0 15.5 17.8 
No change 49.2 57.5 59.8 58.8 
Worsened 41.4 28.6 24.6 23.4 
N (weighted) 2,089 1,829 1,850 1,869 
Panel B. Females 
    
Improved 9.2 13.2 14.1 14.9 
No change 46.8 55.2 54.4 57.9 
Worsened 43.9 31.5 31.3 27.1 
N (weighted) 2,491 2,204 2,216 2,196 
Panel C. Moscow/St. Petersburg 
    
Improved 9.8 18.0 14.8 18.6 
No change 46.5 55.6 632 62.1 
Worsened 44.1 26.3 21.8 19.2 
N (weighted) 954 389 436 432 
Panel D. Regions (except Panel C) 
    
Improved 9.1 13.1 14.7 15.9 
No change 48.1 56.3 56.1 57.8 
Worsened 42.7 30.5 29.0 26.1 
N (weighted) 3,649 3,644 3,630 3,633 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the VCIOM data.  
 
 
3. The Macro-economic Background  
As shown in Table 7, the shock of perestroika had a massive impact on the 
pattern of industry after growth began again. In essence, heavy industry 
(‘machine-building’), the powerhouse of the economy both before and after the 
Second World War, remained depressed, agro-based and light industries 
recovered slowly and oil and chemicals recovered rapidly. The share of 
Siberia’s regions in total industrial output, which rose from 20% to 33% between 
1990 and 1997, continued to rise after 2000, although in the south of the region 
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some oblasts continued to decline. In Central Russia, there was a gradual 
decline in the share of industry from 23% to 15% in favour of the industrial 
regions located on the Yamal-Taymur-Ural-Volga (geographical) axis (Treivish, 
2007). Finally, the ten regions of the western industrial belt in European Russia, 
incorporating Moscow and St Petersburg, also gained, with a share rising from 
45% in 1997 to 53% in 2004 (IISP, 2005).18  
 
Table 7. Industrial Output Shares by Industry (%) , 1991-2004 
Industry 1991 1995 2001 2004 
Power Utilities 3 14 10 11 
Fuel  7 16 20 22 
Non-Ferrous Metallurgy 5 9 8 12 
Ferrous Metallurgy 6 7 8 7 
Chemical and Petrochemical  7 8 7 6 
Machine Building  24 18 21 19 
Timber, Pulp and Paper 6 5 4 4 
Construction Materials  4 5 3 3 
Light 17 3 2 1 
Food 18 12 14 13 
Other 3 3 3 2 
Source: IISP (2005). 
 
 
  These changes in the structure of production provide the background to 
the changing levels of income, and of consumption, in each region.  The data on 
GRP per capita show striking differences between resource-rich regions and 
Moscow vis-à-vis the Republics (Ingushetia, Tyva, Dagestan, Karachay-
Cherkessia, Kalmykia, Altai, Kabardino-Balkaria) and oblasts (Ivanovo, 
Bryansk, Jewish Autonomous, Chita). Even in 1994, at 6,176 roubles, Moscow’s 
GRP per capita was 8.2 times higher than in mainly agrarian Ingushetia 
Republic and 1.7 times higher than Russia’s average GRP per capita of 3,583 
roubles (FSSS, 2005). The divide between resource-poor and resource-rich 
regions widened after growth resumed (Figure 2). In 2002, Ingushetia’s GRP 
per capita was 30 times lower than in Tyumen oblast (including Khanty-Mansi 
AO and Yamal-Nenets AO) even after the cost-of-living adjustment (Zubarevich, 
2005) 19, and in 2005, Moscow’s GRP per capita was 3 times higher than 
Russia’s average GRP per capita of 125, 773 roubles, while Tyumen’s was 5.3 
times higher (FSSS, 2007).  
 
 
                                                        
18
 The following ten oblasts/krai dominate Russia’s industrial output: Tyumen (9.1%), Moscow 
(6.9%) Sverdlovsk (4.6%), Samara (4.0%), Chelyabinsk (3.8%), Bashkortostan (3.7%), 
Tatarstan (3.5%), Krasnoyarsk (3.5%), Nizhny Novgorod (2.9%), and Kemerovo (2.9%). The 
2004 shares include Moscow oblasts (4.1%) and exclude Kemerovo oblast.  
19
 Estimates exclude Evenki and Taymur autonomous okrugs - which were merged into 
Krasnoyarks Krai in January 2007.   
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Thus, as noted by previous commentators (eg Yemtsov 2003:10; Service 
2003:539), there were two particular groups of losers among Russian regions 
during the period of perestroika and after: on the one hand, primarily agrarian 
regions with poor infrastructure on the southern edge of the federation, some of 
which (Dagestan, Ingushetia) were also adversely affected by being on the 
edge of the Chechnya conflict, and on the other hand, regions of heavy industry 
in Siberia (e.g. Chita, Irkutsk) which were exposed as uncompetitive by the 
freeing of prices after 1992, and which lacked the political clout to attract 
resources to protect either industrial activity or living standards during the period 
of economic recovery after 2000. Regional policies aimed at cushioning the 
negative impact of structural changes differed in scope, effectiveness and 
timing. IISP (2005) report shows that some regions continued to provide food 
subsidies (e.g. Ulyanovsk oblast and Tatarstan) while Moscow, Khanty-Mansi 
AO and Yamalo-Nenets AO continued to provide allowances and subsidies. 
The poorest regions lacked fiscal capacity to provide social protection. The 
Russian north and most regions in Siberia suffered especially badly as the 
‘northern coefficient’ - compensating differential in regions with adverse climatic 
conditions - was phased out (Service 2003: 539). According to Hanson (2007), 
around 30% poorer regions regularly depend on transfers from the federal 
budget; one of the poorest regions, Tyva Republic, relied for 81% of its 
budgetary revenue on transfers from the federal budget. Per capita social 
spending was higher in regions with higher-than-average levels of GRP per 
capita and minimum subsistence level (Kuznetsova, 2005).  
 
Adjustment to global market forces involved a shift (Figure  3) from non-
tradables to tradables – involving, in Russia and a number of other countries,  
the substitution of unprofitable state manufacturing activities in both heavy and 
light engineering industry, mostly labour-intensive,  by oil, gas and minerals 
exports, which currently account for a quarter of Russian federal GNP and over 
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80% of exports20, but are highly capital-intensive and less productive of local 
linkage activities than manufacturing and construction21, employing less people 
than the Russian railways (Hanson 2007) and unable to convert any significant 
part of the growth to which they give rise into livelihoods for poor households 
with limited skills.  
 
 
 
 
 
The nature of this structural shift defines the nature of the gainers and 
losers from the adjustment process. The gainers were people with skills 
adapted to the requirements of the ‘new’ (capital- and skill-intensive) economy 
and regions intensive in natural resources, which attracted inward investment; 
the losers (the ‘perverse cases’ with increasing poverty levels) were individuals 
with low levels of skill unable to adapt to the demands of the ‘new economy’ and 
regions, some in the west and some on the eastern and southern periphery, 
which either never had any labour-intensive tradable activities or lost them with 
the onset of perestroika22. 
                                                        
20
 Hanson 2007: Figure 4. 
21
 A similar evolution towards a capital-intensive pattern of production as a consequence of 
adaptation to the global market – and once again, increases in poverty in many districts - is 
visible, with even more dramatic political consequences,  in the Bolivia case study of our ESRC 
project (Mosley 2007) 
22
 Data on output dynamics across industries show that machine building and light industries 
(textiles, leather, shoes, and furs) were severely affected, with the latter being almost wiped out 
east of the Urals and concentrated in the European part of Russia. By 1996, the industrial index 
dwindled by 70% (in relation to 1991) Ivanovo oblast (textiles), Moscow oblast and Pskov oblast 
(machine building). In the North Caucasus, industrial index fell by 77% in relation to 1991, in 
Karachay-Cherkessia and 84% in Dagestan Republics (mainly agricultural ethnic Republics).  
Chemical and metallurgical (ferrous and non-ferrous) industries (centred in Vologda, Lipetsk 
and Samara oblasts, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan Republics, and Krasnoyarsk Krai)  declined 
Figure 3. Industrial Production Indices, 1992-2004 
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4. Explanations of poverty at the level of policy: regional-level analysis  
   
How are we to understand these trends in poverty in Russia, national and 
regional, and what can be learned from them about possibilities for further 
reducing that poverty? A strong tradition in development economics, much 
developed by the World Bank’s empirical research in the 1990s, answers:   the 
best anti-poverty policy is a good pro-growth policy, or, in the words of the 
famous paper by Dollar and Kraay (2001, 2003) ‘growth is good for the poor’. 
Dollar and Kraay’s main result, derived from a cross-section of industrialised 
and developing countries, was that the elasticity of poverty (measured 
somewhat idiosyncratically as the share of the bottom 20% in national income) 
with respect to GDP growth was robustly negative, with a mean of minus one: in 
other words, a one per cent increase in GDP growth rate can be expected to 
yield a one per cent reduction in poverty. But growth of GDP, as revealed by 
much subsequent research (for example Ravallion 2001, Epaulard 2003, 
Mosley 2004; World Bank 2006; Besley and Cord 2007), is not always pro-poor: 
for example, between 1990 and 2005, ten of 47 (developing and transitional) 
countries which exhibited positive growth of per capita GDP between surveys 
experienced an increase in headcount poverty.  
 
And within countries experiencing significant growth in GNP – even those 
which have experienced overall falls in poverty – the poverty of many regions 
and vulnerable occupational groups has deteriorated (Datt and Ravallion 2002 
for India, and several country studies in Besley and Cord 2007). Such diversity 
of experience is particularly to be expected, and as we have already seen 
occurs, in Russia, the largest country in the world. Within Russia, only one 
study so far has examined inter-regional variations in poverty, namely Yemtsov 
(2003), which covers only the period of perestroika and negative growth 
between 1992-2000. Yemtsov finds that in Russia overall there is a orthodox 
negative growth elasticity of poverty – but, indeed, wide variations between 
regions, with a complete absence of inter-regional convergence. We now apply 
this approach to Russia’s poverty experience through the subsequent period of 
oil boom and positive GDP growth. In particular, we seek to explain how 
Russia’s recent poverty dynamics, as described in the previous section, varied 
across its federal subjects, and how those variations can be related to  policies 
and institutions at the federal and local level. We can gain an initial impression 
of the regions where the return to growth did not improve living standards by 
means of a simple scatter-diagrams (Figures 3 and 4) of changes in poverty in 
relation to growth in income measured by Gross Regional Product (GRP). We 
begin by estimating a Dollar-Kraay growth regression for the Russian 
Federation separately during the periods of macro-economic decline (1996-
1999) and recovery (2000-2005), periods between which, as we have seen, 
revisions were made to the method of calculating the overall poverty index.23 
 
The general trend in Figure 4 is for majority of regions to experience a 
rise in poverty as income fell in the late 1990s. Although, as illustrated in that 
Figure, the overall relationship between these two variables (formally, the 
regression line linking percentage change in poverty to percentage change in 
income) was negative, with a slope, or ‘poverty elasticity’, of about minus 0.47) 
                                                                                                                                                                  
by 32-42% (IISP, 2007a). 
23
 The estimates of coefficients derived from fixed-effects regressions and implemented with a 
set of time indicator variables are shown in textboxes.  
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this relationship did not by any means pertain universally across all regions. In 
thirty of the 76 ‘federal subjects’, those in the bottom right-hand quadrant of 
Figure 4, rise in poverty levels was combined with rising GRP. However, the 
fixed-effects model results suggested an insignificant relationship between the 
headcount poverty rate and GRP. Yet the scatter-diagram assists in identifying 
regions where recovery was more rapid while poverty rose above levels of the 
mid-1990s. It is obvious that the 1998 crisis cased a new wave of destitution, 
albeit - short-lived, across majority of regions. In some regions (for instance, in 
Bryansk, Ivanovo, Magadan and Ingushetia) galloping poverty rate was coupled 
with stagnating economy.  
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Figure 4. Poverty vs. GRP for 1996-1999
 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 5, most of Russia’s regions experienced a decline 
in poverty once growth resumed in the early 2000s. The overall relationship 
between poverty and GRP was negative, with a slope, or ‘poverty elasticity’, of 
about minus 0.9. In seventy nine of the 81 ‘federal subjects’, those in the bottom 
left-hand quadrant of Figure 5, poverty levels by 2005, after five years of growth 
in the federal economy, had fallen sharply. However, as we shall discuss below, 
the response of poverty to growth at the aggregate (federal) level is far below 
what it is in most other middle-income countries, or indeed globally, where the 
World Bank in 2006 estimates a poverty elasticity of about -2.5 (World Bank 
2006, figure 4.3) The implication is that in majority of regions which returned to 
growth, the character of growth in some regions is such that the overall level of 
poverty decreases for less individuals. It will be a major task of the rest of this 
paper to understand why this is, and thereby to gain some understanding of the 
dynamics of poverty within the post-crisis Russian economy 
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Figure 5. Poverty vs. GRP for 2000-2005
 
 
As was illustrated by Figures 4 and 5, there was in general, across the 
‘federal subject’ territories, a tendency for poverty, both in the pre- and in the 
post-2000 period, to decline as growth rates increased; however the 
proportionate rate of decline (the ‘poverty elasticity’) across the entire 1996-
2005 period is only -0.5324 – half the level estimated by Dollar and Kraay in the 
late 1990s and one-fifth of the central cross-section estimate of poverty 
elasticity presented in the 2006 World Development Report (WDR). Even in the 
period after 2000, it is only -0.86, or one-third of the WDR value.  Moreover, in 
thirty of the 76 federal subjects in the 1996-1999 period, positive growth rates of 
GDP in particular regions were accompanied not by reductions in poverty but 
rather by increases: growth was of a type which was actually inimical to escape 
from poverty. These patterns are catalogued in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. 
 
Why is the poverty elasticity low (by international standards) across the 
federation as a whole, and why is it perverse in a number of regions? One 
important reason for the low overall poverty elasticity, we would argue, is 
embedded in the characteristics of structural adjustment itself described in 
Section 3. Thus whether a particular region experienced a fall in poverty during 
the 2000-05 period  depended on whether its local economy grew or not, and if 
it did grow, the rate at which this growth was converted into poverty reduction 
(the ‘poverty elasticity’ ) was dependent partly on its economic characteristics 
(whether the growth was of a kind which had a high propensity to suck in low-
income labour) and partly on its political characteristics (whether the region was 
able to attract public expenditure and other policies which were capable of 
offsetting poverty, either through the labour market, or through increasing 
consumption standards (e.g. consumption and minimum wage policies) –
policies which we collectively describe as the ‘social efficiency wage’: the 
                                                        
24
 We estimate fixed-effects model of the relationship between poverty and growth for the entire 
period.  
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elements in the allocation of public resources which impinge on political 
stability25. We have elaborated elsewhere the concept of the social efficiency 
wage and illustrated varying ways of using it in different country contexts 
(Hudson, Lenton and Mosley 2009). We propose, therefore, a hypothesis in 
which poverty dynamics within a particular region depend partly on that region’s 
industrial structure – and in particular on whether that industrial structure 
impacted on the local labour market in such a way as to pull out of poverty 
those who had lost their jobs under perestroika - and partly on the effectiveness 
of the policy instruments which it deployed to support pro-poor tendencies 
within the labour market. In this paper these pro-poor instruments – the level of 
social expenditure, pensions and subsidies - are treated principally as an 
exogenous influence on poverty. They are modelled endogenously, and the 
political forces underlying them are explained in more detail, in a companion 
paper, Mussurov and Mosley (2007b). The essence of our story, however, is a 
chain with three links:  the social efficiency wage and the pattern of structural 
change inflicted by perestroika determine the level  of poverty: the instruments 
which comprise the social efficiency wage are determined by fiscal constraints, 
degree of democracy, and the desire to prevent political instability; and the risk 
of rioting and other forms of political instability is determined, as per the 
standard economics- of-conflict literature, by costs and benefits of rebelling 
against the state as well as by locally specific factors such as local institutional 
weakness and the politicisation of the opposition (Fiess et al. 2008). The linkage 
on which we focus here is the first, the determinants of the poverty elasticity. 
We now conduct a regression analysis on this relationship, with a view to 
understanding the inter-regional variations portrayed in Figures 3 and 4. 
 
  
5. The Model  
 
The general argument is that the low overall poverty elasticity of growth in 
Russia represents a potential political liability for the government, as it is 
symptomatic of the emergence of an underemployed underclass lacking the 
skills to hold down jobs in the new, albeit rapidly-growing, economy, and 
constituting a political threat especially if this poverty combines with other 
grievances. In those regions where a perverse poverty elasticity combined with 
ethnic or other demands for autonomy, the federal state was vulnerable, and 
might be expected to pump resources into such regions to pre-empt politically 
destabilising action. The resources which it injected might come in various 
forms – subsidies on the prices of ‘sensitive’ items such as food and heating 
fuel, pensions, variations in the mix of public expenditures, and variations in the 
minimum wage. Collectively we refer to these alternative channels for injecting 
public resources into the economy as the social efficiency wage – an increase 
in the social wage designed to achieve greater economic stability, by analogy 
with the private efficiency wage of labour economics, in which increases in the 
private wage achieve increases in the stability and productivity of the labour 
force. 
 
Our model visualises a government determined, in whatever way it can, 
                                                        
25
 The optimal level of the social efficiency wage is the social wage which minimises political 
instability and thus maximises the probability of the ruling party staying in power, just as the 
private efficiency wage maximises the stability and hence the productivity of the labour force 
(Mosley 2007). 
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to maximise its chances of retaining its hold on power 26, and using the social 
efficiency wage as an instrument to enable it to do this. We assume that the 
government’s hold on power will be improved by economic success (e.g. high 
rates of economic growth) but damaged by political instability. A high level of 
civil disruption combined with poor economic performance is a calamity for any 
government, and defines a ‘disaster zone’ in which the likelihood of holding on 
to power is very poor.  
 
The significance of the social efficiency wage instrument, in this context, 
is that if correctly chosen it will increase the incumbent government’s chances 
of keeping away from loosing its’ grip on power. We reason that up to a certain 
point, increases in the social efficiency wage, mediated through any of the 
instruments previously described 27, will move the trade-off so as to give it a 
better change of holding on to power. How effectively a government is able to 
do this depends on how well it is able to gauge the impact of changes in 
expenditure, through the channels of influence identified earlier, on the 
sensitivities of local interest groups. 
 
The government, therefore, maximises a utility function consisting of two 
elements: the size of the investible surplus, hence the growth rate (X) and risks 
to political stability (R).  
 
U= f1(X, R)                                                                                         (1) 
 
In (1) the investible surplus X is simply the difference between the 
marginal product of labour (L) and its cost, which consists of the wage (w) plus 
any social efficiency wage premium (p) that is paid: 
 
X = g(L) – w – p                                                                                  (2) 
 
The growth rate of labour productivity, ∂g(L)/∂t, depends fundamentally 
on the standard factors of production of the new growth theory literature (capital 
K, skills H, initial income Y0, etc); but also on the risks of political instability, R. 
 
∂g(L)/∂t = f2 (Y0, K, H; R)                                                                     (3)      
  
The risks to political stability, including the associated risk of conflict, 
depend on initial conditions (social capital, inequality σ, history of conflict C, 
etc), and on incidental shocks (S). But they also, and this is the main novelty of 
our approach, depend on the size of the social efficiency wage premium (p) 
which is paid: 
 
R = f3 (I(σ, C ), S, p)                                                                           4) 
 
Within this expression, the impact of the social efficiency wage, p, on 
political instability, R, is the aggregate of its impact on specific social and 
occupational groups. Thus for social groups 1, 2…n, 
                                                        
26
 Appropriate behavioural assumptions for governments depend on decision-making 
mechanisms within government. See Drazen (2002, Chapters 2 and 3).  
27
 Changes in the expenditure mix, changes in the level of social expenditures, variations in 
pensions, and variations in subsidies/price controls seem to be the alternative formulations of 
this instrument most practised in Russia.  
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dR/dp =  ((∂R1/∂p1)dp1 + (∂R2/∂p2)dp2 +….+∂Rn/∂pn)dpn                    (5) 
 
and the key element in the setting of p consists in its allocation between 
different interest-groups. It will already be clear that the determination of the 
social efficiency wage depends on the relative perceptions, militancy and social 
leverage of different groups and specifically, in this context, on the ability of 
government to reduce the risk of blockage or rebellion by specific social groups, 
∂Ri/∂pi, by varying the element of the social efficiency wage which pertains to 
each of them. In the limiting case, if only one group is able to exercise influence, 
its preferences will dominate in determining the social efficiency wage; but 
typically its value will be determined by a process of coalition formation between 
different social groups (de Janvry, Fargeix and Sadoulet (1993)).  
 
Thus the recipient government maximises (1) subject to the requirement 
that the risk of conflict, which we see as proportional to the ratio of expected 
gain to expected loss, not fall below some disaster level 28: 
 
R < R*                                                                                                      (6) 
 
Thus, maximising government utility ((1)) subject to the constraint (6) and 
incorporating expressions (2) through (5), the optimal level of the social 
efficiency wage premium, p*, is the value of p which solves 
 
0R*]λ[R
p
R)(X
=−−
∂
−∂
         (7) 
 
This solution condition reduces to: 
 
[ ] 0][),),,((() 22021 =−−−−−∂∂ ′ R*(I,S,p)fλpSCIfp)w,K,H;R(p))(Y(ffp( σ  (7’) 
 
In other words, the optimal level of the social efficiency wage depends on initial 
conditions (inequality, social capital and past conflict history), the parameters of 
the aggregate production function (initial income,  physical and human capital) 
and the impact-coefficients of social expenditure in favour of particular interest 
groups, p, on the risk of political instability,  R: 
 
( ) nn pRpRpRHKYSCIfp ∂∂∂∂∂∂= ,...;,,;,),(( 22,110* σ     (8) 
 
Further, from (3) the reduced form for the growth of productivity is: 
 
)),,(;,,()( *302 pSIfHKYftLg =∂∂       (3’)        
 
where p* is the value of  p which solves (7’) 
 
An issue of particular interest is whether, in particular environments, the 
social efficiency wage reflects the preferences of the poor, so that it becomes 
good politics to practise expenditure policies which benefit low-income people.  
                                                        
28
 This is exactly the same approach as that taken in chapter 7 of Mosley et al (2003), where the 
farm household maximises utility subject to the requirement that income (or assets) not fall 
below some ‘disaster’ level. 
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In the stabilisation and adjustment literature, there is a tradition of arguing that 
since the poor are not the most militant, and lack political leverage and 
resources, this is unlikely to be the case 29. However, this tradition may now be 
incorrect: if the nonpoor see it as in their interest to form coalitions in support of 
policies which will promote the interests of the poor as well as theirs (such as 
universal primary education, in developing countries), or if there are powerful 
pro-poor external actors (such as non-governmental organisations and aid 
donors in developing countries) willing to exercise leverage in support of pro-
poor expenditure patterns, then the adoption of a pro-poor expenditure mix will 
be politically attractive and will reduce instability.  
 
What is the likelihood that the adoption of ‘politically efficient’ social 
efficiency wage policies, p*, will result in a pro-poor outcome?  In Mussurov and 
Mosley (2007), we argue that the pro-poor impact of  the  prevailing growth 
pattern will be determined by, first, the representation of the poor in the setting 
of the social efficiency wage and second,  the ability of the (private-sector) 
growth process to reduce poverty, which we treat as related to capital-intensity.  
 
Our main empirical and policy interest in what follows will be to establish 
the driving forces behind the level of poverty. Thus, in the first paper, we 
estimate reduced form poverty equation (see Mussurov and Mosley 2007 for 
extended applications of this model), using a dependant variable - Headcount 
poverty rate (Pov). We explore the determinants of poverty in the context of a 
dynamic-panel data model from the following regional-level specification: 
 
itit
X
ti
Pov
ti
Pov εβα ++
−
=
'
1,,
           (9) 
itiit
νµε +=   
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where i indexes regions and t indexes time periods. X  is a vector of controls, 
containing the “social efficiency wage” (SEW) and a proxy for capital-intensity 
(Energyind).30 The disturbance term (
it
ε ) has two orthogonal components: the 
fixed effects, 
i
µ  , and idiosyncratic shocks, 
it
ν  .  
 
To control for the possible correlation between lagged dependent 
variable and the error term as shown by Nickell (1981), equation (9) is 
expressed in the first difference form. Subtracting 
1, −ti
Pov   from both sides of 
equation (9) gives the following transformation:  
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First-differencing the data removes region-specific fixed effects but there 
is still correlation between the differenced lagged dependent variable and the 
                                                        
29
 ‘A focus on social equity is not necessarily relevant to understanding the politics of 
adjustment, because the politically most active groups are not usually the poorest’ Haggard, 
Lafay and Morrisson (1995, p. 120). 
30
 For a definition of the variables, see the Data Appendix.  
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disturbance process. To estimate equation (9), we apply the dynamic panel 
data GMM derived by Arellano and Bond (1991) and augmented Arellano-Bond 
estimator modified by Arellano-Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The 
Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimator augments Arellano-Bond by making an 
additional assumption, that first differences of instrument variables are 
uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the introduction of more 
instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency. It builds a system of two 
equations, the original equation as well as the transformed one, and is known 
as System GMM.  
 
As discussed by Roodman (2006), both are general estimators designed 
for situations with 1) “small T, large N" panels, meaning few time periods and 
many individuals; 2) a linear functional relationship; 3) a single left-hand-side 
variable that is dynamic, depending on its own past realizations; 4) independent 
variables that are not strictly exogenous, meaning correlated with past and 
possibly current realizations of the error; 5) fixed individual effects; and 6) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals but not across them. In 
sum, the estimators (Difference and System GMM) handle fixed effects and 
endogeneity of regressors, simultaneously avoiding dynamic panel bias shown 
by Nickell (1981).  
 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
Assuming the log-linear relationship, the Difference GMM System and GMM 
results are displayed in Tables 8 and 9. As our panel is unbalanced, we used 
orthogonal deviations to transform the data. 31 To reduce the instrument count, 
we limit the number of instruments generated in both Difference GMM and 
System GMM estimates. Our poverty equation expresses poverty as a function 
of the propensity to take on low-income labour (the capital intensity) of the 
regional economy, and of the level of the social efficiency wage.  The first 
column in Table 8 shows the results of the one-step Arellano-Bond estimator 
determining the level of poverty, and the last two columns estimates the model 
by cutting the instrument count.  
 
Treating independent variables as weakly endogenous and using 
regional tax revenue 32 - in addition to a time indicator variable – as an 
instrument, we observe that poverty responds negatively to the regional level of 
the social efficiency wage. However, the full-instrument variant in column (1) 
produces insignificant coefficient of the lagged levels of ΔLn(SEW). The Hansen 
test shows implausibly perfect p value of close to 1.00, the classic sign of 
instrument proliferation (Roodman, 2008). Cutting the number of instruments 
leads to the estimates presented in the last two columns. Columns 2 and 3 
suggest that both of these variables (SEW and Industry) are significant in 
determining poverty elasticity: poverty is significantly responsive to social 
expenditure, and to the salience of the industrial sector. We take (Energyind) as 
                                                        
31
 We use 1995-2004 regional-level data for 81 regions. See the Data Appendix for further 
details. 
32
 Assumption is made that the percentage share of social expenditure (SEW) in regional 
budgetary expenditures is linked to regional tax revenues from corporate, personal income and 
property taxes. Fixed-effects estimates have shown positive and significant effect of the log of 
tax revenue on SEW. Data on per capita SEW - a preferred measure – is unavailable.  
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a proxy for capital-intensity: the oil and gas sectors, which accounted for 27% of 
output and 60% of  the country’s exports in 2006, employ fewer people than the 
Russian railways, and employ only 2 per cent of the employed workforce 
(Hanson 2007:  873-874). The J-test of overidentifying restrictions confirms that 
instruments are not strictly exogenous.33  
 
 
Table 8. Difference GMM Regression of Poverty 
 
Full 
instruments 
Second-lag 
instruments 
only 
Collapsed 
instruments 
Ln(Povt-1) .773*  
(.04) 
.830* 
(.052) 
.851* 
(.054) 
ΔLn(SEW) -.241**  
(.108) 
-.137 
(.153) 
-.240*** 
(.140) 
Ln(SEWt-1) -.050 
(.049) 
-.041 
(.054) 
-.081 
(.054) 
ΔLn(Energyind) -.110* 
(.011) 
-.122* 
(.013) 
-.141*  
(.014) 
Ln(Energyindt-1) -.017*** 
(.009) 
-.010 
(.011) 
.002 
(.011) 
Year .011** 
(.004) 
.011** 
(.004) 
.015 
(.004) 
N of observations 615 615 615 
N of groups 81 81 81 
N of instruments 118 26 27 
AB test for AR(1):  
Prob. > z 
.000 .000 .000 
AB test for AR(2):  
Prob. > z 
.001 .006 .030 
Hansen test (p value) .991 .000 .000 
Notes: All regressions are one-step Difference GMM. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
Results from System GMM regressions are shown in Table 9. It will be 
useful to re-connect the findings of Table 13 with our Difference GMM model 
estimates. One striking difference between the Difference GMM and System 
GMM lies in statistical insignificance of the relevant coefficients. In particular, 
estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest lack of statistically significant relationship 
between poverty and social expenditures. We also find that coefficients on 
lagged poverty levels are slightly higher. In column 4 we use two-period lags 
from the Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) collapsed instruments. The 
new point estimates of the coefficients on differenced and lagged poverty levels 
are statistically significant. We also find that proneness to poverty at regional 
level is significantly affected by the salience of the industrial and energy sectors 
                                                        
33
 Results of the Hansen test must be interpreted with caution as the p value appears 
suspiciously high. See Roodman (2008, pages  9-11) for the detailed arguments when a p value 
should be viewed with concern.  
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and confirmed by the positive and significant coefficient of Ln(Energyindt-1). The 
difference test does not allow us to reject the null when instruments are lagged.  
Table 9. System GMM Regression of Poverty 
 
Full 
instruments 
Second-lag 
instruments 
only 
Collapsed 
instruments 
Collapsed 
second-lag 
instruments 
Ln(Povt-1) .947* 
(.037) 
.956* 
(.039) 
.951* 
(.049) 
1.182* 
(.111) 
ΔLn(SEW) -.103 
(.086) 
.047 
(.100) 
.097 
(.129) 
-0.697* 
(.217) 
Ln(SEWt-1) .029 
(.048) 
.017 
(.055) 
-.033    
(.051) 
-.306*   
(.099) 
ΔLn(Energyind) -.108* 
(.012) 
-.117* 
(.013) 
-.143* 
(.015) 
-.387* 
(.078) 
Ln(Energyind
 t-1) .004 
(.009) 
-.0001    
(.011) 
.002 
(.013) 
.161* 
(.047) 
Year -.0003 
(.004) 
.003 
(.004) 
.010 
(.004) 
.045 
(.011) 
N of observations 697 697 697 697 
N of groups 81 
 
81 
 
81 
 
81 
 
N of instruments 122 
 
52 31 9 
AB test for AR(1):  
Prob. > z 
.000 .000 .000 .000 
AB test for AR(2):  
Prob. > z 
.001 .004 .033 .131 
Hansen test (p 
value) 
1.000 .006 .000 .294 
Difference-Hansen 
tests (p values): 
1.000 
 
 
.987 .451  
Notes: All regressions are one-step System GMM. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
 
In Table 9, the main policy factor is the behaviour of social expenditure, 
which is significantly greater in the ‘orthodox’ poverty-elasticity group, in which 
poverty declined sharply, than in the low and perverse poverty-elasticity group, 
in which poverty rose. Other factors favouring a positive poverty elasticity are: 
(i) a diversified local economy, with high levels of inward investment (Pskov, St 
Petersburg) (ii) a continuing secessionist threat and high levels of political 
protest activity (Ingushetia, Karachay-Cherkessia, Tuva) which tended to impel 
high levels of  federal subsidy and local-level social spending, and (iii) the ability 
of the local tertiary education system to retrain people whose skills had been 
made redundant by the recession into the skills demanded by the ‘new 
economy’. The politics underlying the differing local levels of social expenditure, 
and other elements of the social efficiency wage, are discussed in detail in our 
companion paper, Mussurov and Mosley (2007b). 
 
 We can illustrate this further by making three case-study comparisons 
between ‘successful’ and ‘failing’ regions, one for regions which were always 
poor prior to 1990 and one for new poor regions which had industrialised before 
1990 but which fell sharply during the perestroika period. Within each 
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comparison we take two regions which had similar initial conditions (in the 
sense of 1995 levels of poverty and gross regional product), but evolved very 
differently thereafter.  
 
 The first comparison is between  two ‘new poor regions’, with initial 
(1995) poverty rates of about 30% and quite high gross regional product: Pskov 
(in the north-west), where poverty has declined dramatically with the growth of 
the 2000s, and Ulyanovsk (on the Volga), where in spite of growth in real gross 
regional product, poverty levels have increased since 1995. Both regions, in 
terms of the terminology introduced on page 13, are ‘newly poor’ : they have, 
since the late nineteenth century and amplified by the Five-Year Plan periods, 
good infrastructure and a heavy concentration of economic activity within 
machine-building, all of it in the 1980s state-owned, and both as a consequence 
suffered heavily under perestroika in the 1990s.  Their evolution since 2000 has 
been very different. Ulyanovsk, loyal to the man after whom it is named34, 
maintained during the 1990s, under three different governors, elements of a 
command economy. de Melo and Ofer (1999: 13) describe it at that stage as 
being ‘at the bottom of the list for reform’, many of which it still maintains, 
including ceilings on profits and trade markups and restrictions on food exports 
to other regions, whereas Pskov’s local administration is very heavily orientated 
towards the private sector35. In Ulyanovsk unlike Pskov there are very low levels 
of inward foreign investment (de Melo and Ofer 1999), and the main domestic 
industry, aircraft manufacture, has become so inefficient that ‘even Aeroflot 
does not want to buy its low-quality airplanes’ (Orttung et al 2000: 597).  
Indicators of social capital are also inferior in Ulyanovsk: unlike Pskov, it has 
very low access to non-government media: only local, primarily government-
owned, newspapers are read,  there are no privately-owned radio and television 
stations, and the local democracy indicator is much higher in Pskov than in 
Ulyanovsk.  Although we must be cautious about inferring causation from these 
data, the superficial impression is that Ulyanovsk is caught in a low-level 
poverty trap, with the authorities’ response (repression of both the media and 
the private economy) deterring foreign investment, inhibiting diversification of 
the local economy, and disincentivising the formation of both human and social 
capital, including those skills required to put any momentum behind progressive 
reform at the local level. All of these resource constraints prevent the labour 
market from growing quickly and responding to the needs of the new globalised 
economy, and this, we speculate, was a major cause of persistence in the 
differing dynamics of local poverty levels.  
 
Next we compare two regions of Siberia. The ‘improving’ region is Chita, 
an important base of the military-industrial complex in Siberia on the Trans-
Siberian railway quite close to the Chinese border, and the ‘declining’ region is 
Khakassia, on the upper Yenisei river in central Siberia. Four relevant points of 
contrast  are the trend of private investment – close to zero in Khakassia but  
increasing much more rapidly in Chita; (2) the labour market -dynamic and 
flexible in much of Chita (much of its workforce consists of Chinese immigrants 
                                                        
34
 Lenin’s true name was Vladimir Ulyanov; ‘Lenin’ was a pseudonym assumed years after he 
became a political activist (Service 1997:70). 
35
 Although orientated towards the private sector Pskov is a mixture of new-style 
entrepreneurship, encouraged by the region’s nearness to St Petersburg and the EU Baltic 
states, and old-style oligopoly and patronage, much of it centred on the oblast-owned alcohol 
production monopoly, Pskovalko (Orttung 2000:442, Dininio and Orttung 2005) 
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willing to accept jobs at a lower rate than Russians) and rigid and 
monopsonistic in Khakassia (which is basically a ‘company region’, almost 
entirely devoted to the production of aluminium); and (3) political orientation – 
relatively radical in Chita - the city has had a radical tradition ever since 1825 
when it provided a sanctuary for the Decembrists (participants in the attempted 
rebellion intercepted and punished  that year by Nicholas I). Even now support 
for United Russia in this ‘city of exiles’, as it is widely known, is, by contrast with 
Khakassia, well below the national average.  
 
 Finally we consider two ‘always poor’ regions with headcount poverty 
rates of over 50%, an agrarian economic base and poor infrastructure, both of 
them in the Muslim-dominated south Caucasus zone (see Figure 12.7). These 
are Ingushetia, adjacent to Chechnya, which has reduced poverty substantially 
since the late 1990s, and the Kalmyk Republic, which has experienced an 
increase in poverty. The major observable policy difference is that Ingushetia 
has experienced a larger inflow of federal spending – indeed 88% of its budget 
is provided by the federal government36. This is a loyalty bonus which rewards 
the fact that Ingushetia, unlike Chechnya, did not rebel during the 1990s. 
Financed by this bonus, social spending has grown rapidly since the 1990s, and 
there has also been a greater diversification of the fundamentally agrarian 
economy into petrochemicals and oil and gas derivatives. In essence Ingushetia 
and its neighbour Dagestan, like many African countries, have in the 2000s 
been experiencing aid-led growth – the aid in this case being provided by 
subsidies from the federal administration.  None of this has improved the quality 
of governance, which on one account ‘is widely regarded by its people as a 
kleptocracy kept in power by military force, electoral fraud and Russian 
support’37; yet even Ingushetia has a lower democracy index than the Kalmyk 
Republic, whose  President, Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, more than rivals Ingushetia in 
political violence and has poured much of his republic’s investible resources into 
a string of white elephant projects, including four personalised white Rolls-
Royces, a virtual casino open to anyone with access to the international 
computer network, a gold-plated statue of Buddha, and a ‘chess complex’ 
designed to put Kalmykia on to the map as the chess tournament capital of 
Russia38. Finally, it must be stressed that one key element in Ingushetia’s 
standing as the most improved performer poverty-wise in Russia is a simple 
bounce-back from the appalling levels of destitution encountered during the 
mid-1990s as the consequence of much of the capital stock being destroyed by 
the civil war. 
  
  The implication, requiring further investigation, is that the areas suffering 
from perverse poverty elasticities (eg Ulyanovsk, Ivanovo, Krasnoyarsk among 
the new poor group; Kalmykia among the old poor group) lacked the political 
impetus, and as a consequence did not inject the fiscal and human resources, 
required to impel and diversify the economy into a pro-poor pattern of growth. It 
may also be that in some regions (eg Chita) the resilience of private production 
on small subsistence plots, which for many was a key factor in buffering 
livelihoods in face of job loss under perestroika has helped keep the pattern of 
                                                        
 
37
 The Independent, 3 September 2008, p22, the source of this quotation, reports the murder on 
1 September of Magomed Yevloyev, the owner of a website critical of the Ingush government. 
38
 ‘Overall, [Ilyumzhinov] owns 36 cars which are garaged in a variety of cities around the world 
so that the president can use them when he travels.’ Orttung (2000):177. 
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growth pro-poor. It must be emphasised that, at this stage, our hypotheses 
concerning the determinants of poverty elasticity (except for social expenditure, 
on which the evidence is quite strong) remain well short of fully established.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The impact of recovery from the severe recession of the 1990s has been 
regionally very diversified and varied with the indicator of well-being chosen. For 
the federation as a whole, headcount poverty began to diminish in 2000, but 
indicators of mortality and morbidity took longer to turn positive, and although 
the increase in inequality has now hit a plateau, it has not yet begun to diminish, 
and some dimensions of this indicator, in particular inequality between men and 
women, are still getting worse.  
 
 The extent of poverty reduction has varied enormously, with some 
regions continuing to experience increases in poverty even though they have 
returned to growth. We attempt to understand and analyse the reasons for this 
regional variation. We focus on two principal causative factors: the changes in 
economic structure resulting from the liberalisation of the economy, and policy 
instruments aimed at poverty reduction. Many regions which experienced 
structural change under perestroika (notably those benefiting from the current 
oil and gas boom) experienced massive growth in GDP but little poverty 
reduction, because their prevailing production function is capital-intensive and 
thus they were unable to transmit much or any reduction in poverty through the 
labour market. And in a number of cases, even highly qualified and skilled 
individuals who lost livelihoods during the rationalisation of the state sector in 
the nineties were unable to gain them, and remained poor, during the recovery 
period to date.  Regions where the growth of the early 2000s was based more 
on the service sector tended to be more effective at generating poverty 
reduction. 
 
 In certain cases, even if the prevailing production function was not 
poverty-reducing, it could be made more so through public policies – ‘social 
efficiency wage policies’, as we refer to them - which either subsidised 
consumption, or either indirectly or directly created employment. Under this 
heading we examine the levels of social expenditure, [subsidies and pensions]. 
We find that the regional poverty elasticity is directly related to levels of ‘social 
efficiency wage policies’ of this type, and that social expenditure is, in a number 
of regions, responsive to indicators of social unrest, including votes for the 
opposition party, which is in turn directly related to unemployment (Table 4). 
Thus political action, potentially and in some regions, acts as a safety-valve – 
the political tensions caused by failure to relieve poverty in some regions have 
led to political actions which have raised the ability of growth to moderate 
poverty and thereby made the region more stable. This mechanism must not be 
over-dramatised, but it acts, as illustrated by the case studies of Table 5, as a 
significant corrective factor to the weak pro-poor impulse of the economy in a 
number of regions. Actions aimed principally at protecting the security of central 
and regional government have in several cases, it seems, had a distinct pro-
poor spin-off. 
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Data Appendix 
 
We used two data sources in this paper. Our first sample was drawn from the 
bimonthly Monitoring of Economic and Social Changes public opinion survey 
conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion Research (or VCIOM, its 
Russian acronym) in July and September 2000-2004. Each VCIOM survey 
covers around 2,500 individuals aged 16 and above; multistage stratified 
sampling technique was used to ensure that a representative sample of the 
national population was polled. Interviews were conducted in all of the country’s 
economic-geographical regions, including Moscow and St. Petersburg. Some of 
the territorial-administrative regions in the South Caucasus (due to the military 
conflict in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, and Northern Ossetia) and in the 
Far North (due to remoteness of Kamchatka, Chukotka, Sakhalin, and some of 
other autonomous okgruks) were excluded.39 Data were collected, among other 
things, on a range of basic demographic and education indicators; labour 
market behaviour and outcomes; voting behaviour, the level of trust in 
government institutions, political parties and politicians; protest potential in 
different social groups and attitudes toward reform. Summary statistics for the 
VCIOM data are given in Appendix Table A.1. The original survey oversampled 
Muscovites by around 300 respondents. In the estimates shown in Tables 3-5, 
we use individual weights provided by the Levada centre to account for this 
problem. We do not use sample weights in our regression analyses. In Panel B, 
identification in the selection equation is achieved by including additional 
variables: number of working household members (Working members) and 
twelve dummy variables that indicate different sources of income as reported by 
respondents (Primary job, Secondary job, Self-employment, Informal 
job/pension, Stipend, Child benefit, Cash transfers, Subsistence farm, Rent, 
Property sale, Shares/ interest). In the Heckman and PSM estimates shown in 
Panel B and Panel C, the regressand (Family income) is an indicator variable.  
  
In the GMM estimates, the regional-level data source is the ‘Regiony 
Rossii’ (‘Regions of Russia’) annual publication by the FSSS. The publication 
contains major indicators that feature social and economic development of the 
subjects of the Russian Federation. The yearbook contains statistics on 
demographic and ecological situation in the regions, employment and 
unemployment, money income and consumer expenditures of population; 
health care, education and culture, housing, criminal situation; investments, 
indices of prices (tariffs) for goods and services. Statistics of industries of the 
economy by regions and information on budget revenues of the regions of the 
Russian Federation as well as crediting and deposits of population are 
presented. Summary statistics for the Regiony Rossi data are given in Appendix 
Table A.2. We use regional-level data from consolidated budget expenditures to 
create predictor variables: share of regional expenditures on industry/energy 
(Energyind) and total regional-level budget revenue (Revenue).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
39
 See:  http://www.levada.ru/eng/monitoring.html for further details of the sampling frame
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Appendix Table A.1. Summary Statistics for the VCIOM data.  
 July/Sep 2000 July/Sep 2002 July/Sep 2004 July/Sep 2006 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Reported Income  1577.08 1949.82 2131.51 2750.52 1634.63 1508.66 1732.55 1596.72 
Heckit Income  1625.76 1901.72 2269.35 3012.07 1677.47 1495.99 1759.87 1551.51 
PSM Income  1642.96 2122.1 2263.71 3102.05 1682.10 1553.71 1751.86 1604.51 
Age 45.60 17.72 45.82 18.33 44.99 18.29 45.04 18.34 
Age2 2393.67 1708.48 2436.01 1765.76 2359.62 1757.62 2365.72 1762.08 
University 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 
Specialised 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.43 0.26 0.44 
Vocational 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.38 0.48 0.12 0.32 
Secondary 0.17 0.38 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Moscow 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38 
St. Petersburg 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.16 
Rural 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 
Female 0.63 0.48 0.61 0.48 0.62 0.48 0.64 0.47 
Family income 0.91 0.28 0.90 0.29 0.92 0.25 0.92 0.25 
Working members 1.26 0.99 1.30 1.02 1.36 1.04 1.33 1.02 
Primary job 0.66 0.47 0.68 0.46 0.70 0.45 0.70 0.45 
Secondary job 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.28 
Self-employment 0.03 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 
Informal job/pension 0.07 0.26 0.09 0.29 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.27 
Stipend 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.49 
Child benefit 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.19 
Alimony  0.15 0.36 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.13 
Cash transfers 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.32 
Subsistence farm 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.13 
Rent 0.04 0.21 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.06 0.23 
Property sale 0.008 0.09 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.13 
Shares/interest 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.13 
N 4,814 4,739 4,815 4,816 
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Appendix Table A.1. Summary Statistics for the Regiony Rossii data.  
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Log Poverty overall 3.42 0.39 1.98 4.55 N = 781 
 between  0.34 2.14 4.43 n = 81 
 within  0.22 2.76 4.11 T = 9.64 
       
Log SEW overall 3.82 0.22 2.26 4.33 N = 789 
 between  0.17 2.91 4.09 n = 81 
 within  0.17 2.53 4.44 T = 9.74 
       
Log Energyind overall 1.05 1.12 -3.50 3.64 N = 788 
 between  0.55 0.06 2.97 n = 81 
 within  0.99 -3.94 3.34 T = 9.72 
       
Log Revenue overall 8.69 1.15 4.88 12.88 N = 790 
 between  0.89 6.93 11.68 n = 81 
 within  0.75 6.57 10.39 T = 9.75 
       
Year overall 1999 2.87 1995 2004 N = 790 
 between  0.54 1999 2002 n = 81 
 within  2.84 1995 2004 T = 9.75 
 
